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PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 10-1082
_____________
LI HUA YUAN, A/K/A SHU CHEN HSU
ZHOUGUI NI,
Petitioners,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
_______________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA 1:A077-997-645 and BIA 1:A088-777-224)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Frederic Leeds
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 14, 2011
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 22, 2011 )
_______________

Gary J. Yerman, Esq.
Yerman & Associates
401 Broadway - #1210
New York, NY 10013
Counsel for Petitioners
Dalin R. Holyoak, Esq.
Kevin J. Conway, Esq.
Office of Immigration Litigation
Civil Division
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 10044
Counsel for Respondent
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Li Hua Yuan petitions for review of an order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
Her husband, Zhuo Gui Ni, joins her petition on a derivative
basis. For the following reasons, we will deny the petition.
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I.

Background

Yuan, a native and citizen of China, arrived in the
United States in February 2002 and attempted to gain entry
using a non-immigrant visa issued to her under a false name.
Shortly thereafter, in a secondary inspection, Yuan told an
immigration officer that she was single, from Nantang Wan
Li Village, Lian Jiang District, Fuzhou City, Fujian Province,
China, and that she had fled China because her impoverished
parents were forcing her to marry a man in exchange for
money. The next month, in March 2002, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued Yuan a Notice to Appear
(“NTA”), charging her with being inadmissible for lack of
proper documentation in violation of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), and for fraudulently or willfully
misrepresenting a material fact – namely her identity – to gain
entry to the United States in violation of INA
§ 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).
In July 2002, Yuan filed an application for asylum and
withholding of removal. 1
She identified two bases for
asylum: the impending forced marriage in China and the
punishment she would receive from the Chinese government
for being a practitioner of Falun Gong. In October 2003, after
hearing Yuan’s testimony, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
sustained DHS’s charge of inadmissibility for lack of proper
documentation and denied Yuan’s application, finding that
1

Yuan’s application does not clearly indicate that she
was seeking relief under the CAT. She was nevertheless
treated as having sought CAT relief.
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she was not credible and, in any case, had not shown that she
satisfied the requirements for asylum, withholding of
removal, or protection under the CAT. 2 In April 2005, the
BIA denied Yuan’s appeal without opinion.
Yuan timely moved to reopen her removal proceedings
in July 2005 and attached a new asylum application. In her
new application, Yuan claimed that she and Ni had given
birth to a daughter in December 2004, that they were planning
to have additional children, and that she “fear[ed] that if she
is sent back to China, she [would] lose the chance to have as
many children as she likes” due to Fujian Province’s birth
control policy, which, in Yuan’s case, would permit no more
than two children. 3 (See App. 2 at 1066.) In September
2005, the BIA denied the motion to reopen, concluding that,
since Yuan’s one child did not put her in contravention of the
policy and Yuan had presented no evidence that China
sterilizes its citizens for having foreign-born children, Yuan
had failed to show a well-founded fear of persecution in
China.
Yuan again moved to reopen in May 2007. She also
attached to her motion an amended version of her July 2005
asylum application, which included documentation indicating
that she had given birth to a second daughter and documents
regarding enforcement of China’s birth control policy. In
September 2007, the BIA granted the motion to reopen. The
2

The IJ did not address the fraud charge under INA
§ 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).
3

The policy allegedly permitted a second child, if the
first child was female.
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BIA explained that, since Yuan was seeking to reapply for
asylum and withholding of removal based on changed
circumstances in China, the motion fell within the timeliness
and numerical limits exception under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 4 The BIA further explained that, since the
authenticity of Yuan’s family planning policy documents had
not been resolved, it was appropriate to remand Yuan’s case
to an IJ to “hold additional hearings to address the
authenticity of the evidence presented with the motion, …
[Yuan]’s credibility, and her eligibility for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.” 5
(App. 2 at 911.)
4

As we have previously explained, the birth of
children in the United States is a change in personal
circumstances, not a change in conditions in China. Liu v.
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2009).
Thus, the BIA’s analysis should have focused on whether
Yuan had presented evidence that was previously unavailable
or undiscoverable since her last hearing.
See id.
(commending the BIA for focusing on availability of
evidence). However, that issue, which would have arisen
from the motion to reopen, is not before us now.
5

At about this time in the chronology of events, May
2008, DHS issued an NTA to Ni, charging him with removal
under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i),
because he was allegedly a native and citizen of China who
had entered the United States without having been admitted
or paroled by an immigration officer. Ni filed his own
asylum application, claiming that he had married Yuan in
January 2008, that they together had two daughters, and that
either he or Yuan would be forcibly sterilized by the Chinese
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In advance of Yuan’s post-remand hearing, Yuan and
DHS submitted several documents to the IJ, including
information on China’s birth control policies and, from Yuan,
various affidavits, letters, statements, and certificates in
support of her claims. The IJ delayed the proceedings several
times so that Yuan or DHS could satisfy authentication
concerns about Yuan’s documents, but neither party was able
to do so. DHS objected to much of Yuan’s documentary
evidence, noting that several items were copies instead of
originals and lacked appropriate corroboration and
authentication. The IJ ultimately admitted Yuan’s documents
but noted that the “legitimate issues” raised with respect to
their authenticity could affect their evidentiary weight. (Id. at
184-86.)
After dealing with those preliminary questions, the IJ
conducted a hearing in May 2009, at which Yuan testified.
Yuan said that she was born in China’s Fujian Province, met
government if they returned. At a hearing held approximately
two weeks later, Ni admitted the allegations in the NTA and
conceded that he was removable as charged. Shortly
thereafter, the IJ granted Ni and Yuan’s motion to consolidate
their cases. Ni later withdrew his claims for withholding of
removal and CAT protection – his asylum application was not
filed within one year of entering the United States and so was
untimely under INA § 208 (a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(2)(B) – and proceeded on a derivative basis on
Yuan’s application. Accordingly, we address only Yuan’s
claims, even though the determination with respect to Yuan
applies with equal force to Ni.

6

and married Ni after she came to the United States in
February 2002, and gave birth here to two daughters. She
testified that, if returned to China, she would be sterilized or
fined under her home village’s birth control policy because
she had two children and was still a citizen of China. She
claimed that she learned of her home village’s birth control
policy from a letter sent by her father, who, at her request,
had approached the village committee to inquire regarding the
policy.
Yuan also submitted documents purportedly
recounting the experiences of persons who had been subject
to enforcement of birth control in China: one was a letter
from someone allegedly named Yang Yun Duan, a neighbor
in Yuan’s village, in which Duan claimed to have been
subject to forced contraception after the birth of her first child
and forced sterilization after the birth of her second child; the
others included statements from Jin Fu Chen, whose wife had
given birth to two children in Japan and who was allegedly
sterilized upon return to China, and Yanyun Wu, who was
allegedly fined and sterilized for fathering a second child in
China after having already fathered a son.
Yuan further testified that she would be fined 30,000
to 50,000 Renminbi (“RMB”), which, under the thenprevailing exchange rate of 6 RMB to 1 dollar, equated to a
fine ranging from $5,000 to $8,333. She claimed that she
would be unable to pay such a fine if returned to China, since
she would stay at home with the children and Ni would
probably earn an estimated 400 to 500 RMB per month as a
construction worker. Yuan said that, though she was not then
working in the United States, she had earned $10,000 per year
working part-time in a restaurant and that Ni also worked in a
restaurant, giving them a combined annual income of
$25,000. She also said that she had been able to repay the

7

$40,000 she owed to the smugglers who brought her to the
United States only because her wages were higher in the
United States than in China.
Yuan’s claim for relief was undercut, however, by
several evidentiary deficiencies and contradictions. For
instance, she failed to produce her father’s letter explaining
the village family planning policy, including the fine
schedule. The letter from her neighbor Duan gave as the
neighbor’s name “Yunrui Yang” rather than “Yang Yun
Duan,” as Yuan had claimed, and it was not authenticated.
Neither was there authentication for the documentation
concerning others who submitted statements on Yuan’s
behalf. When asked why she made no mention of a fine in
her asylum application after having testified at the hearing
about it being of paramount importance, Yuan testified that
she forgot about it. Yuan could not explain the discrepancy
between her testimony of a 30,000 to 50,000 RMB fine and
the Duan letter, which mentioned only a 15,000 RMB fine.
Yuan produced no tax returns to corroborate her testimony
regarding her and Ni’s household earnings. She testified that
both of her children had traveled with their aunt to China,
where they then lived for a number of years with Ni’s mother
and sister and were temporarily registered as part of Ni’s
mother’s household without any family member being fined
or otherwise disadvantaged. She also testified that she and Ni
would reside in the town of Guantao and be registered as part
of Ni’s household if they returned to China, but she failed to
produce any evidence of a Guantao birth control policy. And
though Yuan testified that she planned to have more children
and had been trying to conceive for the past two years, she
had not consulted with a physician to confirm whether she is
able to have more children.
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Following Yuan’s testimony, the IJ issued an oral
decision finding Yuan removable and denying her asylum,
withholding of removal, or relief under the CAT. The IJ
analyzed Yuan’s asylum claim under pre-REAL ID Act
standards because Yuan had filed her original claim prior to
the REAL ID Act’s enactment in 2005, though the IJ noted
that his conclusion about the case would be the same under
post-REAL ID Act standards. 6 The IJ credited the State
Department Report and Profile on China, which indicated that
China did not have a policy of forcible sterilization or fines
for Chinese nationals who simply return to China after having
given birth abroad to two or more children. 7 The IJ gave less
6

The REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, 302 (2005), which became effective on May 11, 2005,
provides that an asylum applicant’s uncorroborated testimony
may alone satisfy his burden of proof “if the applicant
satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is
credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to
demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). In evaluating the testimony, the trier of
fact may weigh it along with other record evidence and may
request that the applicant provide corroborating evidence,
which the applicant must do unless he “does not have the
evidence and cannot reasonably obtain [it].” Id. The REAL
ID Act further provides that the trier of fact may determine an
applicant’s credibility based on a variety of factors. Id.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
7

As the IJ noted, the State Department Report and
Profile did indicate some problems for parents attempting to
obtain free public services for children born abroad, but it
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weight to Yuan’s evidence and observed that the village
committee documentation and other letters regarding forced
sterilization and fines were neither authenticated nor directly
applicable to someone whose children were born in the
United States and that Yuan knew of no similarly situated
person who had been subject to sterilization or fines. As for
the purported potential fine, the IJ found that Yuan’s claimed
fear was not credible, noting, inter alia, the discrepancy
between Yuan’s testimony and Duan’s letter about the
amount of a fine, Yuan’s failing to corroborate the amount of
the fine or her inability to pay, the children having lived in
China with Ni’s mother without fines or difficulty, and
Yuan’s failing to even mention the fine in her application for
relief. The IJ ultimately concluded that Yuan had not met her
burden of proof with respect to her asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT protection claims.
Yuan then looked to the BIA, but the BIA dismissed
her appeal. It disagreed with the IJ regarding the applicability
of the REAL ID Act, concluding that the asylum application
attached to Yuan’s 2007 motion to reopen asserted a new
basis for relief and was thus a new application subject to the
REAL ID Act. However, “upon … de novo review,” (App. 2
at 3), the BIA agreed with the IJ that Yuan had failed to prove
that she was entitled to relief. The BIA identified several
deficiencies in Yuan’s evidence, including that much of it
was either stale, unrelated to birth control policies in Fujian
province, or contradicted by background materials and thus
also indicated that parents could avoid those problems by
paying for services and not registering their children with the
government.
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did not reflect current conditions in Guantao. It noted that
Yuan had established only that fines are sometimes imposed
in Guantao, not that she would be fined 30,000 to 50,000
RMB or that she would be unable to pay such a fine, and it
indicated that her evidence of forced sterilization – i.e., the
materials from Duan, Chen, Wu, and Yuan’s home village –
was not “credible, individualized evidence establishing that
she has reason to fear persecution upon return,” because it
was either inapposite or unauthenticated. Having failed in her
efforts before the BIA, Yuan now petitions us for review.
II.

Discussion 8

We “review the administrative record on which the
final removal order is based.” Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d
150, 155 (3d Cir. 2005). Ordinarily, that means reviewing
only the BIA’s decision. Id. However, where the BIA’s
decision affirms and specifically references the IJ’s decision,
we review the referenced portions of the IJ’s decision also.
Sandie v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir.
2009); Lin v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 543 F.3d 114, 119 (3d
Cir. 2008). Since the BIA’s decision here references the IJ’s
determinations with respect to Yuan’s failures to establish
eligibility for CAT protection and to corroborate her
testimony regarding fine amounts, we review those portions
of the IJ’s decision along with the BIA’s decision. Our
review of factual findings, including findings of persecution
and fear of persecution, is for substantial evidence, which
8

The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15. We have jurisdiction pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
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means we must uphold findings of fact unless the record
evidence compels a contrary finding. Sandie, 562 F.3d at
251. We review legal conclusions de novo. Id.
In her petition, Yuan argues that the BIA erred in
assessing the sufficiency of her evidence and in engaging in
de novo review of the IJ’s factual findings. We address those
issues in turn. 9
9

Yuan also takes issue with the BIA’s conclusion that
her current asylum application is a new application filed after
May 2005 and so is subject to the REAL ID Act. Whether
the REAL ID Act applies can be significant because it
imposes certain conditions upon asylum applicants regarding
credibility and corroborating evidence. See supra note 6
(outlining 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii)). Yuan argues
that the REAL ID Act should not apply because the current
application is merely a continuation of her initial application
filed in July 2002 and so predates the REAL ID Act. We
disagree and instead, for the reasons the BIA set forth,
conclude that Yuan’s application raises a new basis for
asylum following a motion to reopen and so is a new
application rather than a continuation of the initial one, which
had raised different bases for asylum and had been dismissed.
In any event, Yuan’s concern is of no moment. First,
the BIA expressly declined to address Yuan’s credibility.
Thus, even if Yuan could have been subject to the REAL ID
Act’s credibility provision, as a practical matter, she was not.
Second, to the extent that Yuan was subject to the REAL ID
Act’s corroboration provision, it was effectively
indistinguishable from what she would have been subject to
under pre-REAL ID Act law, since under both regimes the
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A.

The Sufficiency of Yuan’s Evidence

“To qualify for asylum or withholding of removal, an
applicant must establish that he has a well-founded fear that
he will be persecuted if removed to his home country on
account of [, among other things,] … political opinion.”
Zheng v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 549 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir.
2008). “[A] person who has a well founded fear that he or
she will be forced to [abort a pregnancy or undergo
involuntary sterilization] or [is] subject to persecution for
[failure, refusal, or resistance to undergo such a procedure]
shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on
account of political opinion.”
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To receive
asylum on account of a fear of forced sterilization, the
applicant must show “a reasonable likelihood” that he or she
will be forcibly sterilized upon repatriation. Id. To receive
withholding of removal on that same basis, the applicant must
make the similar but heightened showing that there is a “clear
probability” of being forcibly sterilized upon return. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).

trier of fact could require Yuan to produce reasonable
corroborating evidence and penalize her for failing to produce
such corroboration or failing to adequately explain the
failures. See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 552-54 (3d
Cir. 2001) (holding that the BIA’s interpretation of the INA to
permit the trier of fact to “sometimes require otherwisecredible applicants to supply corroborating evidence in order
to meet their burden of proof” was reasonable).
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Here, the BIA concluded that Yuan had not met her
burden of showing that she was reasonably likely to be
forcibly sterilized upon return to China. The BIA cited
several evidentiary bases for its conclusion, including that the
evidence proffered on birth control policies was stale or was
irrelevant. Without recounting again all of the BIA’s reasons,
we note that it decided that she had failed to show she would
be unable to pay any potential fine, and that her evidence of
forcible sterilization was either inapposite or unauthenticated.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion and thus
its decision that Yuan is not entitled to asylum.
We also uphold the BIA’s denial of withholding of
removal and CAT protection. An applicant that fails to meet
the eligibility requirements for asylum cannot “meet the more
stringent applicable standard for withholding of removal,”
Mudric v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 469 F.3d 94, 102 n.8 (3d Cir.
2006), as was the case here. Likewise, the evidence that is
here insufficient to show eligibility for asylum and
withholding of removal is also insufficient to show eligibility
for CAT protection, since it does not show that Yuan is more
likely than not to be tortured upon return to China. See 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (an alien must show that it is more
likely than not that he would be tortured, with the consent or
acquiescence of the government, if repatriated).
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B.

The BIA’s De Novo Review and Harmless
Error

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision “upon … de novo
review.” (App. at 3.) Yuan argues that that was error, since,
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i), the BIA is “not to
engage in de novo review” of the IJ’s factual findings. 10 The
government effectively concedes the error but counters that
such error was harmless, since the denial of relief was still
supported by substantial evidence. 11
10

“Facts determined by the immigration judge,
including findings as to the credibility of testimony, shall be
reviewed only to determine whether the findings … are
clearly erroneous.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
11

In stating that it affirmed the IJ’s decision “upon …
de novo review,” (App. 2 at 3), the BIA did not clearly
indicate that it specifically reviewed de novo the IJ’s factual
findings. That is potentially significant, since the BIA is
permitted to review de novo “questions of law, discretion, and
judgment and all other issues in appeals from decisions of
immigration judges,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii), and the BIA
could be understood as referring to those aspects of its
review, which would not make its review erroneous.
However, it appears likely that the BIA did review de novo
the IJ’s factual findings, given that it found additional,
alternative bases upon which to discount Yuan’s evidence.
Alternative findings are incongruent with clear error review,
in which we would expect the BIA to limit its discussion to
whether the IJ clearly erred in its factual findings.
Accordingly, we take it as a given, as do the parties, that the
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We have not applied the harmless error analysis in
reviewing an immigration decision.
Generally, “an
administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds
upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were
those upon which its action can be sustained.” SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). However, the
Supreme Court has explained that “Chenery does not require
that [the Court] convert judicial review of agency action into
a ping-pong game” and that remand to the agency is not
required when it “would be an idle and useless formality.”
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969);
see also Mass. Trustees of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United
States, 377 U.S. 235, 246-48 (1964) (holding remand
unnecessary when the agency’s purported error “had no
bearing on … the substance of the decision”).
Consistent with those principles, many of our sister
circuits have applied a harmless error analysis in the
immigration context. See, e.g., Nadal-Ginard v. Holder, 558
F.3d 61, 69 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that it need not reach
the BIA’s alternative rationale for its decision, since, even if
erroneous, it did not result in prejudice and so was effectively
harmless error); Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th
Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that “the doctrine of harmless
error is applicable to judicial review of immigration
decisions”); Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d
391, 401 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Wyman-Gordon and
Massachusetts Trustees and holding that remand to the BIA
was not required “where there [was] no realistic possibility
BIA reviewed de novo the IJ’s factual findings.
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that, absent the errors, the IJ or BIA would have reached a
different conclusion”); Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182,
191 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Harmless-error analysis applies in
immigration cases.”); Nazaraghaie v. INS, 102 F.3d 460, 465
(10th Cir. 1996) (characterizing the BIA’s alleged failure to
consider certain record evidence as harmless error since “the
result in [the] case would be no different” if the case were
remanded).
We too are persuaded that harmless error analysis
should apply in immigration cases. Accordingly, we will
view an error as harmless and not necessitating a remand to
the BIA when it is highly probable that the error did not affect
the outcome of the case. Cf. Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d
344, 349 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating in the civil context that “[a]n
error will be deemed harmless only if it is ‘highly probable’
that the error did not affect the outcome of the case”); Cao He
Lin, 428 F.3d at 402 (stating that remand is not required
“where the IJ or BIA’s reliance on an erroneous aspect of its
reasoning is so tangential that there is no realistic possibility
that the outcome would be different on remand” or “where –
notwithstanding admitted errors – overwhelming evidence
supporting the administrative adjudicator’s findings makes it
clear that the same decision would have been reached in the
absence of the errors”).
Applying that test here, we have no hesitation in
saying that the BIA’s erroneous de novo review of the IJ’s
factual findings was harmless. As an initial matter, because
the IJ had made factual findings adverse to Yuan, de novo
review, which paid no deference to those adverse findings,
was, if anything, favorable for Yuan. Indeed, the BIA’s
decision to deny Yuan relief is a product of the most
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favorable standard of review Yuan could have received under
the circumstances. Moreover, nothing in the BIA’s decision
manifests a disagreement with the IJ’s factual findings. On
the contrary, the BIA echoed and adopted several of them.
Accordingly, it is highly probable that the outcome of Yuan’s
case would not have been different had the BIA applied the
proper standard of review and paid deference to the IJ’s
adverse findings. The BIA’s error in conducting a de novo
review thus does not necessitate remand.
III.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for
review.
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